Abstract. We study a class of second order variational inequalities with bilateral constraints. Under certain conditions we show the existence of a unique viscosity solution of these variational inequalities and give a stochastic representation to this solution. As an application, we study a stochastic game with stopping times and show the existence of a saddle point equilibrium.
Introduction and preliminaries
We study a class of second order nonlinear variational inequalities with bilateral constraints. This type of inequalities arises in zero sum stochastic differential games of mixed type where each player uses both continuous control and stopping times. Under a nondegeneracy assumption Bensoussan and Friedman [1, 4] have studied this type of problems. They proved the existence of a unique solution of these variational inequalities in certain weighted Sobolev spaces. This result together with certain techniques from stochastic calculus is then applied to show that the unique solution of these inequalities is the value function of certain stochastic differential games of mixed type. In this paper we study the same class of variational inequalities without the non-degeneracy assumption. The non-degeneracy assumption is crucially used in the analysis of the problem in [1, 4] . Thus the method used in [1, 4] does not apply to the degenerate case. We study the problem via the theory of viscosity solutions. We transform the variational inequalities with bilateral constraints to Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI for short) equations associated with a stochastic differential game problem with continuous control only. Then using standard results from the theory of viscosity solutions, we show that the value function of this stochastic differential game with continuous control is the unique viscosity solution of the corresponding variational inequalities. Then for a special case we identify this unique viscosity solution as the value function of the stochastic game with stopping times. We now describe our problem.
Let U i , i = 1, 2, be the compact metric spaces. Let
We assume that:
The functions b and a are bounded and continuous, a(x, u 1 , u 2 ) is C 2 in x uniformly with respect to u 1 , u 2 . The matrix a is symmetric and non-negative definite. Further there exists constant
We assume that (A2) (i) r, ψ 1 , ψ 2 are bounded and continuous.
(ii) There exists a constant
Consider the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs variational inequalities with bilateral constraints
By a classical solution of (1.1), we mean a C 2 -function v satisfying (1.1). Similarly a classical solution of (1.2) is defined.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. In §2, we introduce the notion of viscosity solution and establish the existence of unique viscosity solutions of these variational inequalities by a probabilistic method. In §3, we apply these variational inequalities to treat a stochastic game with stopping times. We establish the existence of a saddle point equilibrium for this problem. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
Viscosity solutions
To motivate the definition of viscosity solutions of the variational inequalities we first prove the following result. 
) if and only if it is a classical solution of the equation
Thus (2.1) clearly holds in this case.
and hence
Thus v satisfies (2.1). We now show the converse. It is clear from (2.1) 
. Then from the above equation, we have
Thus v is a classical solution of (1.1). This concludes the proof of the first part. The second part of the theorem can be proved in a similar way.
is a classical solution of (1.1) if and only if it is a classical solution of the equation
is a classical solution of (1.2) if and only if it is a classical solution of the equation
Theorem 2.1 motivates us to define viscosity solutions for (1.1) and (1.2) using (2.1) and (2.2) repsectively.
An upper semicontinuous function v : R d → R is said to be a viscosity subsolution of (1.1) if it is a viscosity subsolution of (2.1). Similarly a lower semicontinuous function v : R d → R is said to be a viscosity supersolution of (1.1) if it is a viscosity supersolution of (2.1). A function which is both sub-and super-solution of (1.1) is called a viscosity solution of (1.1). Similarly, viscosity sub-and super-solutions of (1.2) are defined.
We now address the question of showing the existence of unique viscosity solutions of (1.1) and (1.2). This is done by showing that (1.1) and (1.2) are equivalent to HamiltonJacobi-Isaacs equations corresponding to a stochastic differential game.
Let ω 1 , ω 2 be two symbols. We formulate a zero sum stochastic differential. In this game,Ū i is the set of controls for player i,
respectively such that
Let (Ω, F , P) be a complete probability space and W (t) a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion on it. LetĀ i denote the set of allŪ i -valued functions progressively measurable with respect to the process W (t). For (ū 1 (·),ū 2 (·)) ∈Ā 1 ×Ā 2 , consider the controlled stochastic differential equation
Let the payoff function be defined bȳ
A strategy for the player 1 is a 'non-antiticipating' map α :Ā 2 →Ā 1 , i.e., for any
LetΓ denote the set of all non-anticipating strategies for player 1. Similarly strategies for player 2 are defined. Let the set of all non-anticipating strategies for player 2 be denoted by∆. Then the upper and lower value functions are defined bȳ
Then we can closely follow the arguments in [3] to show that under (A1) and (A2),V + andV − , respectively, are unique viscosity solutions of
in the class of bounded continuous functions, whereH
whereâ =σσ * . We now establish the equivalence of (1.1) and (1.2) with (2.4) and (2.5) respectively. Proof. The proof of this theorem is a simple consequence of the observation that
As a consequence of this result we have the following existence and uniqueness result for the solutions of (1.1) and (1.2). COROLLARY 2.5.
Assume (A1) and (A2). ThenV + andV − are unique vicosity solutions of (1.1) and (1.2) respectively in the class of bounded continuous functions.
Proof. Since (2.4) has a unique viscosity solution in the class of bounded continuous functions given by V + , we get by Theorem 2.4, thatV + is the unique viscosity solution of (1.1) in the class of bounded continuous functions. Similarly V − is the unique viscosity solution of (1.2) in the class of bounded continuous functions.
Remark 2.6. In the classical case, it is quite clear from the proof of Theorem 2.1 that under (A2)(iii), ψ 2 ≤ v ≤ ψ 1 if v is a classical solution of (2.1). In fact this remains true even in the case of viscosity solutions. Indeed assume (A2)(iii). Then any viscosity solution of (2.1) satisfies
Similar result holds for viscosity solutions of (2.2). Observe that ψ 2 is a viscosity subsolution of (2.1) and ψ 1 is a viscosity super-solution of (2.1). Thus the desired result follows from a general comparison principle on viscosity solutions [2] .
Application to stochastic games
In this section we consider a stochastic game with stopping times. We show the existence of a value and a saddle point equilibrium for this problem. We now describe the stochastic game with stopping times.
Assume that b, σ are bounded and Lipschitz continuous. Consider the stochastic differential equation
Here W is a d-dimensional Brownian motion on an underlying complete probability space (Ω, F , P). Let r, ψ 1 , ψ 2 : R d → R be bounded and Lipschitz continuous functions and
where θ , τ are the stopping times with respect to the σ -field generated by W (t). LetW denote another d-dimensional Brownian motion independent of W , constructed on an augmented probability space which is also denoted by (Ω, 
where W = [W,W ] * . Player 1 tries to minimize R(x, ·, ·), as in (3.2), over stopping times θ (with respect to the σ -field generated by W (t)), whereas player 2 tries to maximize the same over stopping times τ (with respect to the σ -field generated by W (t)). Note that these stopping times need not be finite a.s.. In other words, each player has the option of not stopping the game at any time. We refer to [7] for a similar treatment to stochastic games with stopping times. We now define the lower and upper value functions. Let
The stochastic game with stopping times is said to have a value if V + ≡ V − . We now establish the existence of a value for this problem. Let H :
where a = σ σ * .
Theorem 3.1. The stochastic game with stopping times has a value and a saddle point equilibrium. The value of this game is the unique viscosity solution in the class of bounded and continuous functions of the variational inequalities with bilateral constraints given by
Proof. Using the results of §2, it follows that there is a unique viscosity solution w of (3.4) in the class of bounded continuous functions. We now identify this solution as the value function of the stochastic game with stopping times. We first assume that w is C 2 . Let w(x) > ψ 2 (x). Let θ be any stopping times. Define the stopping timeτ bŷ
where X(t) is a solution of (3.1) with the initial condition X(0) = x. Since w is a smooth viscosity solution of (3.4), by Ito's formula, we have for any T > 0 and stopping time θ ,
Letting T → ∞ in the above equation, we obtain
Now using the first inequality in (3.4) and the definition ofτ in the above, it follows that
Since θ is arbitrary, we get
Next let w is C 2 and w(x) < ψ 1 (x). Define the stopping timeθ bŷ
where X(t) is a solution of (3.1) with the initial condition X(0) = x. Now using the foregoing arguments we can show that
We now prove this result for the general case. Let w ε be the sup-convolution of w, i.e.,
Then w ε → w uniformly in R d as ε → 0, w ε are bounded, Lipschitz continuous, semiconvex and satisfy a.e. on R d ,
for a modulus ρ 0 (see [8] ). Now let w δ ε be the standard mollification of w ε . Then
ε have the same Lipschitz constant as w ε and for any γ > 0, we have
where g δ are uniformly continuous. Let
We now assume w(x) > ψ 2 (x). Define the stopping timeτ as before. Then w δ ε (x) > ψ 2 (x) for sufficiently small ε and δ . Applying Ito's formula for w δ ε , we obtain for any T > 0 and any stopping time θ ,
where X γ (t) is the solution of (3.3) with the initial condition X γ (0) = x. By a standard martingale inequality, for any η > 0, we can find a constant R η such that
Let Ω η ⊂ R d be such that |Ω η | ≤ η and g η → 0 uniformly on B R η \ Ω η . Using this we can find a local modulus ρ 1 such that
Using this in (3.6), we obtain
where ρ 2 is a local modulus. Now using moment estimates [8] , we have
for some constant C > 0 which may depend on T and x. Now using this in (3.7), and passing to the limits γ → 0 and then δ , ε → 0, we obtain
Now letting T → ∞, as before, we obtain
Similarly we can show that
for all x such that ψ 1 (x) > w(x). Thus the stochastic game with stopping times has a value. We now show that (θ ,τ) is a saddle point equilibrium. We need to prove this only when ψ 2 (x) < w(x) < ψ 1 (x). Using the foregoing arguments, we can show that
Clearly (θ ,τ) constitutes a saddle point equilibrium.
Remark 3.2. The above result generalizes the optimal stopping time problem for degenerate diffusions studied by Menaldi [6] . Menaldi has characterized the value function in the optimal stopping time problem as a maximal solution of the corresponding variational inequalities with one sided constraint. He has used the penalization arguments to obtain his results. Here we have used the method of viscosity solutions to generalize the optimal stopping time problem to stochastic games with stopping times. We also wish to mention that Stettner [7] has studied stochastic games with stopping times for a class of Feller Markov processes. He has employed a penalization argument using semigroup theory. Thus our approach is quite different from that of Stettner.
Conclusions
We have studied a class of second order variational inequalities with bilateral constraints. Under certain conditions, we have showed the existence and uniqueness of viscosity solutions by transforming the variational inequalities to HJI equations corresponding to a stochastic differential game. Here we have confined our attention to a particular form of H which arises in stochastic differential games of mixed type. A general form of H can be reduced to this particular form by a suitable representation formula as in [5] . Thus our probabilistic method can be used to prove the existence and uniqueness of viscosity solutions for more general class of second order nonlinear variational inequalities with bilateral constraints.
As an application, we have showed the existence of a value and a saddle point equilibrium for a stochastic game with stopping times. We now give a brief description of a stochastic differential game of mixed type where each player uses both continuous control and stopping times.
Consider the following controlled stochastic differential equation
Here W (t) is a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion on an underlying complete probability space (Ω, F , P) and σ is the non-negative square root of a. The processes u 1 (t) and u 2 (t) are U 1 and U 2 -valued control processes of players 1 and 2 respectively which are progressively measurable with respect to the σ -field generated by W (t). Let λ > 0 be the discount factor. The payoff function is given by
where θ , τ are the stopping times with respect to the filtration generated by W (·).
An admissible control for player 1 is a map u 1 (·) : [0, ∞) → U 1 which is progressively measurable with respect to the σ -field generated by W (·). The set of all admissible controls for player 1 is denoted by A 1 . Similarly an admissible control for player 2 is defined. Let A 2 denote the set of all admissible controls for player 2.
We identify two controls
Similarly we identify the controls in A 2 .
An admissible strategy for player 1 is a map α :
for all s ∈ [0, ∞). The set of all admissible strategies for player 1 is denoted by Γ. Similarly admissible strategies for player 2 are defined. Let ∆ denote the set of all admissible strategies for player 2.
Let S denote the set of all stopping times. LetΓ denote the set of all non-anticipating mapsα : A 2 → A 1 × S for player 1. Similarly let∆ denote the set of all non-anticipating mapsβ : A 1 → A 2 × S for player 2. Player 1 tries to minimize R(x, u 1 (·), θ , u 2 (·), τ) over his admissible control u 1 (·) and stopping times θ , whereas player 2 tries to maximize the same over his admissible control u 2 (·) and stopping times τ. We now define the upper and lower value functions of stochastic differential game of mixed type. Let The functions V + and V − are respectively called upper and lower value functions of the stochastic differential game of mixed type. This differential game is said to have a value if both upper and lower value functions coincide. Now we make the following conjecture.
Conjecture. The value functions V + and V − are unique viscosity solutions of (1.1) and (1.2) respectively in the class of bounded continuous functions. Note that the above conjecture is true for the special case treated in §3. Analogous results also holds when the matrix a is independent of the control variables and is uniformly elliptic [1, 4] .
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